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THE TRUE «AMERICAN RULE"
DRAFTING FEE LEGISLATION
IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST
Mary Frances Derfner*
One of the most fertile fields for new legIslatIon m the past
decade has been the field of court awarded attorneys fees. The tra
ditional Amencan Rule, whICh IS umque among the common law
nations of the world, provIdes that all partIes to the litigation pay
theIr own attorneys fees, regardless of the outcome. 1 Federal
courts are permitted to assess the fees of the wmnmg litigant
agamst the losmg party m only limited CIrcumstances, the most
common bemg when a federal statute provIdes for such fee shift
mg. 2 Pnor to the 1960's, the fee statutes whICh Congress adopted
were relatively few and were only rarely used. Begmnmg with
that decade, however an attorneys fees revolutIOn took place. As
Congress began to pass CIvil nghts and public mterest laws, it rec
ogmzed that pnvate enforcement was essential to make the new
laws effective, and that mcenhves to litigate were essentIal to pro
mote pnvate enforcement. The result was the creatIOn of a speCieS
Director, Attorneys Fees ProJect, Lawvers Committee for Civil Rights Under
Law.
1. The system whICh prevails elsewhere IS known vanously as the English
rule, the continental rule, or the European rule, wherelll prevailing litigant IS reim
bursed by the loser for at least part of his attorneys fees routinely. See note 11
mfra.
2. In addition to thiS statutory exception to the Amencan rule, fees are allowed,
III Amencan federal courts, where provided by contract; III diversity cases where
proVided In applicable state statutes or practices; or under three equitable excep
tions. The first of these IS the common fund theory, where named plaintiff causes
the creation of fund which will be shared by persons not party to the litigation, and
the litigant' fees are paid out of the fund In order to prevent the unjust ennchment
of the nonparties. See, e.g., Sprague
Ticomc Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161 (1939); Trus
tees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527 (1881). A second equitable exception IS the bad
faith, or obdurate obstinacy rationale-the punitive assessment of fees against
partv who either bnngs or defends suit In bad faith, or engages In bad faith dunng
the course of litigation. See, e.g., Vaughn v. Atkmson, 369 U.S. 527 (1962). The third
equitable exception to the Amencan rule IS the common benefit theory, which al
lows fee shifting when
litigant produces generally nonmonetary benefit shared
by nonparties, and the assessment of fees agaillst the defendant will serve to spread
the cost evenly among the beneficlanes. See, e.g., Hall
Cole, 412 U.S. 1 (1973);
Mills
Electnc Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
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of pnvate attorney general, 3 or citizen who sued to vmdicat[ e] a
policy that Congress consIdered of the hIghest pnority"4 and a
proliferatIon of statutes authonzmg awards of attorneys fees to
such litigants. 5
For a tIme, the courts seemed to be full partners m the exten
SIOn of the pnvate attorney general theory and Congress adoptIon
of new statutes authonzmg fees was matched by court declSlons
mvokmg equity powers to award pnvate attorney general fees m
areas not specifically dealt with by Congress. 6 ThIS partnershIp was
3. The tenn prIvate attorney general" was first used by Judge Jerome Frank,
to describe one who brIngs
prIvate enforcement suit. ASSOCiated Indus., Inc. v.
Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir. 1943), vacated as moot, 320 U.S. 707 (1943).
4. Newman
Piggle Park EnterprIses, Inc., 390 U.S. 400,402 (1968).
5. The number of such fee-authorIzmg statutes has almost doubled smce 1960.
Most fee statutes passed smce 1960 have mvolved the broad areas of discrImmation
based on age, race, sex, handicap or other suspect classification, civil rIghts, and con
sumer and environmental protection. E.g., the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(a)(4)(E) (1976); the PrIvacy Act of 1974, Id. § 552a(g)(3)(B); the Hart-Scott
Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. §§ 15c(a)(2), 15c(d)(2), 26
(1976); the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, Id. § 1400(b); the
Truth m Lending Act, Id., § 1640(a); the Fair Credit Reporting Act, Id. § 1681n; the
Equal Credit Opportunity Act, Id. § 1691e(d); the Motor Vehicle Information and
Cost Savmgs Act, Id. §§ 1918(a), 1989(a); the Consumer Product Safety Act, Id. §§
2059(e)(4), 2060(c), 2072(a), 2073; the TOXIC Substances Control Act, Id. § 2619(c)(2);
the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1617 (1976); the Age DiscrImmation
m Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621-624 (1976); the Rehabilitation Act of
1973, 29 U.S.C.A. § 794a(b) (West Cum. Supp. 1979); the State and Local Fiscal As
sistance Amendments of 1976, 31 U.S.C. § 1244(e) (1976); the Federal Water Pollu
tion Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1365(d), 1367(c) (1976); the Ocean Dumpmg Act, Id. §
1415(g)(4); the Deepwater Port Act of 1974, Id. § 1515(d); the Safe DrInkmg Water
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8(d) (1976); the Clean Air Act, Id. § 1857h-2(d); the Voting
Rights Act Amendments of 1975; Id. § 1973l.(e); fee provlSlons m Titles II and VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Id. §§ 2000a-3(b), e-5(k); Title VIII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1968, Id. § 3612(c); the Omnibus CrIme Control & Safe Streets Act of 1968,
[d. § 3766(c)(4)(B); the NOise Control Act of 1972, Id. § 4911(d); and the Age Dis
crImmation Act of 1975,42 U.S.C.A. § 6104(e) (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
6. Most nonstatutory pnvate attorney general" fee awards were made m cases
brought under the Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1986 (1976),
and mvolved Issues rangmg from discnmmation m schools, housmg, Jobs and Junes
to first and fourth amendment vIOlations, police harassment, and redistricting. See
generally M. DERFNER, ATTORNEYS FEES IN PRO BONO PUBLICO CASES: A COMPI
LATION OF FEDERAL COURT CASES (1972) (Lawvers Comm. for Civil Rights, Wash.,
D.C.), repnnted In Heanngs on the Effect of Legal Fees on the Adequacy of Repre

sentation Before the Subcomm. on Representation of Citizen Interests of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 862, at 888-1025 (1973). By the time of
Alyeska Pipeline Serv Co.
Wilderness Soc
421 U.S. 240 (1975), the prIvate at
torney general theory was also bemg applied to cases mvolvmg, Inter alia, umon de
mocracy and falr representatIOn and consumer and environmental protection. E.g.,
M. DERFNER, ATTORNEYS FEES IN PRO BONO PUBLICO CASES: A COMPILATION OF
FEDERAL COURT CASES (1972) (Lawyers Comm. for Civil Rights, Wash., D.C.), re
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dissolved III 1975, when the United States Supreme Court ruled III
Alyeska Pipeline Servtce Co. v. Wilderness SOCtet y 7 that federal
courts had no equity power to award fees,8 and that it was up to
Congress, not the courts, to specify whICh congresslOnal poliCIes
should be promoted by fee awards. 9
pnnted In Heanngs on the Effect of Legal Fees on the Adequacy of Representation
Before the Subcomm. on Representation of Citizen Interests of the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 862, at 1060-62, 1067-107 (1973). Alyeska itself
was an envlTonmental case In whICh the court below had awarded non-statutory pn
vate attorney general fees.
7 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
8. The Court In Alyeska held that, 28 U.S.C. § 1923 (1976), costs statute baSI
cally unchanged smce 1853, depnves federal courts of any equitable power to award
fees, notwithstanding an unbroken line of cases smce 1882 whICh had held that
courts could exercise such power where necessary to do Justice. 421 U.S. at 257.
In 1939, the Supreme Court held:
Allowance of [attorneys fees] m appropnate situations IS part of the hlstonc
equity Junsdiction of the federal courts. Plamly the foundation for the hls
tonc practice of granting reimbursement for the costs of litigation other than
the conventional [statutory] taxable costs IS part of the ongmal authority of
the chancellor to do equity m particular situation.
Sprague v. Ticonlc Nat'! Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 164, 166 (1939) (Frankfuter, J.). In 1973,
the Supreme Court held:
Although the traditional Amencan rule ordinarily disfavors the allow
ance of attorneys fees In the absence of statutory or contractual authonza
tion, federal courts, m the exercise of their equitable powers, may award at
torneys fees when the mterests of Justice so reqUire.
[F]ederal courts do
nut hesitate to exercise thiS mherent equitable power whenever overnding
considerations mdicate the need for such recovery
Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1,4-5 (1973) (Brennan, J.) (quoting Mills v. ElectriC Auto-Lite
Co., 396 U.S. 375,391-92 (1970)) (footnotes omitted). In Alyeska, the Supreme Court
held: "Congress has not
extended any roving authority to the JudiCiary to allow
counsel fees as costs or otherwise whenever the courts might deem them war
ranted. 421 U.S. at 260 (White, J.).
The Alyeska Court did not even attempt to explam why thiS statutory bar should
apply to the pnvate attorney general theory and not to the common fund, common
benefit and bad faith theones which it reaffirmed. See note 2 supra. Mr. Justice
Marshall, dissenting, concluded "that the Court IS willing to tolerate the equitable
exceptions to its analYSIS, not because they can be squared with it, but because they
are by now too well established to be casually dispensed with. 421 U.S. at 278.
9. [C]ongresslOnal utilization of the pnvate-attorney-general concept can m
no sense be construed as grant of authoritv to the Judiciary to Jettison the
traditional rule against nonstatutory allowances to the prevailing party and to
award attorneys fees whenever the courts deem the public policy furthered
by particular statute Important enough to warrant the award.
Congress Itself presumably has the power and Judgment to pick and choose
among its statutes and to allow attorneys fees under some, but not others.
But it would be difficult, mdeed, for the courts, without legislative gUid
ance, to conSider some statutes Important and others unimportant and to al
low attorneys fees only m connection with the former.
421 U.S. at 263-64.
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The mcreasmg Importance of attorneys fees for public Illterest
litigants, and the Supreme Court's curbmg of the courts ability to
fill out congressIOnal policy have made the literal language of at
torneys fees statutes worthy of critical study and have hIghlighted
the need for a careful analytical look at the different types of prOVI
SIons whIch may be used to effectuate certaIn legIslative goals.
In the follOWIng analYSIS, whICh deals with some of the draftmg
categorIes III whICh fee statutes may fall, it IS Important to remem
ber that a provlSlon for attorneys fees IS desIgned to affect the pol
ICy balance, and that fee prOVlSlons will mevitably stimulate or re
tard certam goals and poliCIes, gIvmg an advantage, m varymg
degrees, to one mterest or another There IS no such thmg as a
neutral attorneys fees policy or statute. 10 How the balance IS af
fected, and to what degree, depends on the specific form of the fee
prOVISIOn. ThIS article evaluates how draftIng affects legIslative pol
ICy III two areas: The breadth of statutory coverage and the
standards for receIpt of fees, mcluding how reCIpIent eligibility IS
determmed and how readily fees are awarded.
I.

THE BREADTH OF COVERAGE

There are three general categorIes of fee legIslation: Omnibus,
specific, and generIc. A prOVlSlon whICh authOrIzes fee shiftmg m
any CIvil litigation, whether the mterests promoted are public or
purely prIvate, IS an omnibus provlSlon;l1 one whICh authOrIzes fee
awards under a smgle statute, or a smgle section of a smgle statute,
IS specific; 12 and one whICh authOrIzes fees for cases whICh fall mto
a specifiable category IS generIc. 13
10. While it mIght be argued that the English Rule, where fees are automatic
ally shifted to the lOSIng litigant upon completion of case, IS neutral, such system
favors the wealthIer litigant In pnvate litigation, and the defendant In public Interest
litigation. See notes 16-23 mfra and accompanYing text.
11. ThIS IS the English rule, whICh prevails almost umversaIly The English
system IS described at length In Goodhart, Costs, 38 YALE L.J. 849 (1929). In
England itself, the fee award IS discretionary but the usual practice IS to allow it,
and the amounts awarded foHow ngld schedule of maxImum perrmssible fees for
each task within each court level. The English system has been adopted, with but
few modificatIOns, In other nations within the British Commonwealth, such as
Australia, Canada and New Zealand. Williams, Fee Shifting and Public Interest Liti
gation, 64 A.B.A.J. 859 (1978). The system has been altered and adapted In other
countnes and vanes WIdely from place to place. See ABA INT'L & COMPARATIVE
LAW SECTION PROCEEDINGS-REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON COMPARATIVE PRO
CEDURE & PRACTICE (1962).
The United States, of course, has no omnibus fee proVISIOn.
12. The vast majority of Amencan fee shifting proVISIOns fall under thIS cate
gory
13. The United States Code currently contains but handful of genenc proVI
sIOns. See notes 56-58 mfra and accompanying text.
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Omnibus Fee Legzslatwn

AdoptIon of an omnibus attorneys fees provlSlon would either
reverse or substantIally modify the Amencan Rule," depending
upon whether the prOVlSlon mandated fee shiftmg or merely au
thorIzed it. Either approach-adoptIon of the English system of
umversal mdemnity or authonzatIon of fee shiftmg "in the mterests
of JustIce, or under SImilar standards-poses dangers for the pub
lic mterest litIgant, especIally when applied to purely prIvate cases.
l.

Umversal Indemnity

The benefits and drawbacks of the traditIonal AmerIcan rule as
applied to prIvate litigatIOn have been hotly contested m recent
years. 14 Proponents of the rule argue that a change would deter lit
Igation by creatmg a likelihood that litigants would be forced to pay
double costs. Opponents of the rule argue that a party who wms a
lawsuit IS not made whole if he must pay an attorney s fee out of
hIS own pocket. Since the country has had no experIence with m
demnity m purely pnvate litIgatIon,15 no one really knows what ef
14. See, e.g., Avilla, Shall Counsel Fees Be Allowed? CALIF ST. B.J., March,
1938 at 42; Ehrenzwelg, ReImbursement of Counsel Fees and the Great SocIety, 54
CALIF L. REV 792 (1966); Ehrenzwelg, Shall Counsel Fees Be Allowed? 26 CALIF
ST. B.J. 107 (1951); Greenberger, The Cost of Justtce: An Amencan Problem, An
English Solution, 9 VILL. L. REV 400 (1964); Kuenzel, The Attorney Fee: Why Not
Cost of Litigation? 49 IOWA L. REV 75 (1963); Mause, Winner Takes All: A
Reexammation of the Indemnity System, 55 IOWA L. REV 26 (1969); McCormick,
Counsel Fees and Other Expenses of Litigation as an Element of Damages, 15
MINN. L. REV 619 (1931); McLaughlin, The Recovery of Attorney Fees: A New
Method of Financmg Legal Services, 40 FORDHAM L. REV 761 (1972); Stoebuck,
Counsel Fees Included m Costs: A LogIcal Development, 38 U. COLO. L. REV 202
(1966); Note, Attorney Fees as an Element of Damages, 15 U. CIN. L. REv 313
(1941); Note, Attorney Fees: Where Shall the Ultimate Burden Lie? 20 VAND. L.
REV 1216 (1967); Note, Distribution of Legal Expense Among Litigants, 49 YALE L.
J. 699 (1940); Comment, Court Awarded Attorney Fees and Equal Access to the
Courts, 122 U PA. L. REV 636 (1974). In fact, both Sides of the controversy often of
fer their theory as the remedy for the same problem. For mstance, the supporters of
the Amencan rule argue that it allows the poorer citizen to press hiS claims m court
without the fear that he will be forced to pay both hiS own and hiS opponent' law
yer; supporters of the English rule, on the other hand, argue that poor citizen will
be more, not less, likely to sue under system of umversal mdemnity if convmced
the often prohibitive expenses of litigation would be borne by hiS opponent. Propo
nents of the Amencan rule argue that, if thiS IS true, adoption of umversal mdemnity
would mcrease court congestion by encouragmg recourse to the courts and the msti
tution of more small claims; opponents argue that adoption of umversal mdemnity
would clear the courts by encouragmg out of court settlement.
15. The traditional Amencan rule, as applied to purely pnvate cases, has
great weight of history behmd it, no matter how slim the mitial Justification. The
statutes whICh Congress has passed abrogating the rule have, by and large, con
cerned litigation m the public mterest, and even those fee prOVISIOnS, such as the
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fect umversal mdemnity would have on such litIgatIon. 16 What ef
fect adoptIon of unIversal Indemnity would have on the prIvate at
torney general, however IS clear He would become one of our
most endangered speCIes.
Public Interest litIgatIon IS always uncertaIn at best. The past
decade has seen the erection of a multitude of procedural and JU
rIsdictIOnal barriers: lffim unities have appeared out of nowhere,17
Injured parties have been told they lack standing to complaIn about
the acts that Injured them,18 and litIgants have found themselves
Plant Variety Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2565 (1976), the Trademark Act of 1946, 15
U.S.C. § 1117 (1976) and the Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1976), whICh arguably au
thonze fees for private cases, do so for type of private litigation whICh also affects
the public. And even then, those statutes typIcally adopt standards whICh permit the
award In only narrow range of cases, generally "in exceptional cases.
The bad faith exception, one of the equitable exceptions to the American rule,
permits fee awards In private litigation, thereby promoting the public Interest In
fair system of Justice. It can therefore be saId to be public Interest exception even
when applied In pnvate litigation. The other equitable exception whICh permits an
award of fees In private cases, the common fund/common benefit exception, shifts
the fees not to the opposing litigant, but to all benefiCIaries of the litigation, and IS
therefore Inapposite.
16. In England, there IS much less litigation than there IS In the United States.
ThIS fact has led many commentators to believe that unIversal Indemnity would In
crease the Instances of out of court settlement and decrease litigation, thereby acting
as solution to court congestion. See, e.g., Goodhart, Costs, 38 YALE L.J. 849, 862-72
(1929); Kuenzel, The Attorney Fee: Why Not Cost of Litigatton? 49 IOWA L. REV
75, 80 (1963). What IS unfortunate IS that adoption of the English rule, if it would de
crease litigation here, would doubtless deter the less wealthy litigant more than the
wealthy one. See generally Mause, Winner Takes All: A Reexamination of the In
demnity System, 55 IOWA L. REV 26 (1969) (examines the English rule under
mathematical formula and draws from psychology In an attempt to discover what ef
fect Indemnity would have on private litigation In thIS country).
Under the American rule, it IS saId that poor plaIntiffs In private cases are kept
out of court because they cannot afford lawyer to represent them. But thIS IS rarely
true In private federal litigation, where the umque American contingent fee system
permits the litigant to hIre an attorney. Here, the plaIntiff risks costs and expenses,
and the attorney risks uncompensated hours; neither IS SIgnificantly out of pocket if
the suit IS unsuccessful. Under the English system, however, the poor plaIntiff,
should he lose, owes both hIS own attorney and that of hIS opponent. Unless plaIn
tiff IS Judgment proof, he IS gOing to thInk tWIce before filing even the most meritori
ous case.
The most frequently cited example of the unfaIrness of the American rule IS the
small claIm whose value IS exceeded by the lawyer fee. If an Injured party IS not
wealthy, the chances of hIS riskIng more than tWIce the potential damages to recover
are slim mdeed, even with an all but aIrtight case.
17. See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); Pierson
Ray, 386 U.S.
547 (1967).
18. See, e.g., Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Orgamzation, 426 U.S. 26
(1976).
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frustrated by bIzarre exhaustIon and abstentIon rules. 19 Simply
gammg a Judge s ear IS hard enough, but then one must prove
one s case, and IS now often reqUIred to prove an mtent on the
part of the defendants to disobey the law 20 The rules of the game
can, and often do, change m midcase.
As public mterest law becomes more sophIstIcated and more
complicated, the tIme and expense mvolved mcreases. The oppo
nent m public mterest litIgatIOn IS more often than not either a
public body or a corporatIOn, with resources to litIgate every pomt
to the hilt, mcluding multIple appeals and remands.
A purely pnvate case IS less uncertam, less complicated and
less expenSIve than a public mterest case. Furthermore, pnvate lit
IgatIon often produces a monetary recovery for the plamtiff whICh
Justifies the nsk mherent m litIgatIon. If umversal mdemnity deters
the less wealthy litIgant m a purely pnvate case, the deterrent ef
fect of umversal mdemnity on a pnvate attorney general must be
staggermg.
In England, Canada, and the other Commonwealth natIons,
there are very few pnvate attorneys general. 21 While rules whICh
limit standing may partIally explam thIs,22 it IS logIcal to as
sume that unIversal mdemnity IS also largely to blame. 23 There IS
no country whIch adopts umversal mdemnity and has laws treatmg

19. See, e.g., Stone
Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976); Hicks
Miranda, 422 U.S.
332 (1975).
20. See, e.g., Baker v. McCollan, 99 S. Ct. 2689 (1979); Washmgton v DaVIS,
426 U.S. 229 (1976).
21. Williams, Fee Shifting and Public Interest Litigation, 64 A.B.A.J. 859, 862
(1978).
22. Id.
23. Law refonn bodies m Australia and Canada have acknowledged that
costs mdemnity effectively bars the pnvate enforcer from access to the
courts, and they recognize the merits of the Amencan costs practice m thiS
type of litigation.
That Australia and Canada, whICh traditionally have applied fee shifting
m all cases, should now be ready to abandon the pnnclple m public mterest
suits m order to make the proceeding Viable IS mstructive. Expenence m
these countries mdicates that the mtroduction of fee shifting m the United
States could well end the role of the pnvate enforcer m litigation of thiS
kmd. Fee shifting undoubtedly would help compensate the successful party,
but what its advocates fail to acknowledge IS that for the government, corpo
ration, or mdivldual charged with breach of the public mterest, the benefit
would be much more Significant. The threat of litigation would all but disap
pear.
Id.
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a public mterest litIgant and a pnvate litIgant differently when it
comes to fee shiftmg. The Amencan Rule, however, has per
mitted the United States to engage its pnvate citIzens m helpmg to
enforce its laws by passmg fee prOVISIons whICh typIcally protect
the pnvate attorney general from assessment of hIs opponent's
counsel fees should he lose, and encourage hIm to sue by makmg
fee awards almost automatIc should he wm.
It IS not a mere comcIdence that public mterest litIgatIon, the
contmgent fee, and the Amencan rule are all UnIque to the United
States. AdoptIon of unIversal mdemnity would obvIously dispose of
the contmgent fee. The possibility that it would also dispatch the
pnvate attorney general should make legIslators and public mterest
groups extremely wary

2.

Modified Indemnity

Several attempts have been made m recent years to authonze
fee shiftmg m any CIvil case when a fee award would serve the "in
terests of JustIce."24 While thIS approach seems, on its face, more
equitable and less nsky for the pnvate attorney general, it shares
many of the drawbacks of unIversal mdemnity because it covers
both public mterest and pnvate actIons. 25
The differences between public mterest cases and pnvate
cases are SImply too great to encompass withm the language of a
smgle, general fee statute. The largest difference between pnvate
and public mterest cases IS that pnvate cases generally reflect no
specific policy no goal to be favored, no claIm or defense to be en
couraged or discouraged. In short, they reflect a preference for
stnct neutrality and a focus purely on the mdivIdual case. Con
versely public mterest cases anse under specific statutes enacted
to achIeve certam legIslatIve goals. Clearly the "interests of JUS
24. E.g., H.R. 7826 & 8221, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) (sponsored by Rep.
John F Seiberling, Democrat of the 14th CongressIOnal distnct of OhIO). The Bill
was Introduced less than month after Alyeska. "If In Civil action the court deter
mmes the Interests of Justice so reqUire, the court shall award reasonable attorneys
fees to the prevailing party. The United States shall be liable for such fees the same
as pnvate party. ld. When the 94th Congress failed to act on thiS measure, Rep.
Seiberling reIntroduced the bill to the next Congress. H.R. lOlO5, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1977).
25. Even if thiS type of language IS, through legislative history or otherwise,
seen as restoration of the pnvate attorney general" rationale, authonzIng fees only
m public mterest litigation, it IS an Inadequate answer to the problem of encouragmg
pnvate citizens to sue m the public Interest. See notes 61-64 mfra and accompanymg
text.
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tIce" standard could not have the same meanmg m purely pnvate
cases, where neutrality IS necessary and m public mterest cases,
where equity favors the sIde seekmg to assert and vmdicate con
gresslOnal policy Would fees be awarded as a matter of course, or
only rarely? Should a court treat plamtiffs and defendants equally
or favor one SIde or the other? The answers are, of course, differ
ent for pnvate and public mterest cases, and even for different
types of public mterest cases, yet any attempt to develop different
standards from Identical language would be apt to create dangerous
confuslOn withm the courts. ThIS confuslOn would be mtensified by
the difficulty whlCh often anses m definmg the diVIding line be
tween pnvate cases and public mterest cases, especIally m those
many cases whlCh have both pnvate and public elements.

B.

Specific Fee Legzslatwn

By far the greatest number of federal fee prOVlSlons are spe
cific; that IS, they authonze fees for suits under only particular stat
utes, or particular sections of those statutes. 26 Such prOVlSlons are
clearly adjuncts to specific legIslative poliCIes, and as such are gen
erally attached only to those statutes whlCh Congress deems of the
utmost Importance. 27
The greatest benefit of the specific statute IS that it can be
tailored to the particular situation with great preclSlon. 28 Leglsla
26. Some of these proVISIOns authonze fee shifting under an entire chapter of
the United States Code, e.g., Wire Interception Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (1976); some
for suits under subchapter of the Code, e.g., Plant Variety Protection Act, 7 U.S.C.
§ 2565 (1976); Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (1976);
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; ld. § 2000e-5(k) (1976); CommunIcations Act
of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 206 (1976); Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 8 (1976), some
for suits under section of the Code, e.g., Unfair Competition Act, 15 U.S.C. § 72
(1976); State and Local Fiscal ASSistance Amendments of 1976, 31 U.S.C. § 1244(e)
(1976); Water Pollution Prevention and Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (1976); and
some for subsection, e.g., Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2059(e)(4) (1976),
TOXIC Substances Control Act, Id. § 2619(c)(2); or paragraph of subsection, e.g.,
Freedom of Infonnation Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(E) (1976); Pnvacy Act, [d. §
552a(g)(3)(B); National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, 15 U.S.C. §
1400(b) (1976).
27. One can, m fact, get an mteresting view of Amencan history smce the Re
construction by ascertainIng whICh statutes contamed fee shifting proVISIOns. For ex
ample, our first fee shifting measures were contained m the Enforcement Act of
1870, Ch. 114, § 12, 16 Stat. 140, whICh prohibited certam acts of raCial discrImma
tion m voting. Similarly, m the decade followmg the Crash of 1929, fee provISIons
were mcluded m, mter alia, the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1976); the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Id. §§ 78i(e), 78r(a); the Trust Indenture Act, Id. §§
77ooo(e), 77www(a); the Noms-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 107(e) (1976); the Fair
Labor Standards Act, Id. § 216(b).
28. For example, the Noms-Laguardia Act fee prOVISIon, 29 U.S.C. § 107(e)
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tors at least must face questIons of how the prOVlSlon should be
drafted to promote the goals of one very explicit, limited citIzen
suit provIsIOn. Greater care can be taken to answer those questIons
than IS possible with a broader fee prOVlSlon. ConfusIOn m the
courts IS also aVOIded. The courts, at least after Alyeska, know
whether they can or must award fees m a gIVen case depending
upon whether the suit IS brought under a statute whICh au
thonzes fee shiftmg. 29 As the legIslatIve hIstory of specific fee pro
VISIons IS becommg more and more detailed,30 Judges discretIon IS
becommg correspondingly cIrcumscribed, and declSlons more um
form.
On the other hand, m light of Congress mcreasmg reliance
upon pnvate citIzens to enforce the laws whIch it passes, and the
Supreme Court's mSIstence that fees be awarded only when Con
gress has specifically so authonzed, thIS approach seems both tIme
consummg and mefficient. In order for congressIOnal response to
Alyeska to be complete, it would be necessary under the specific
approach, to Isolate every law Congress has ever passed; to decIde
whICh of these laws contam a congressIonal policy Important
enough to merit fee shiftmg (or whICh sectIons of a law do and

(1976), authonzes fees to successful defendants alone, because under that Act it IS
the defendants rather than the plamtiffs who assert the federal nght. LikeWise, under
the Trademark Act fee proVIsion, 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (1976), fees are allowed "in ex
ceptional cases, and to plamtiffs and defendants equally, because the rIght bemg as
serted or protected IS baSically prIvate one.
29. Under the nonstatutory prIvate attorney general rationale, the Judges dis
cretion was necessarily extremely broad, and different Junsdictions frequently came
to different conclUSIOns about virtually Identical cases. Compare Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc.
EPA, 484 F.2d 1331 (1st Cir. 1973), with Natural Resources
Defense Counsel, Inc. v. EPA, 512 F.2d 1351 (D.C. Cir. 1975). The broader the cov
erage of the fee prOVISion, the broader the Judges discretion, so that thiS situation
might well repeat itself under both an omnibus prOVISIOn and an extremely broad ge
nenc provIsion. See notes 61-64 Infra and accompanymg text.
30. By comparison to the public mterest fee prOVISIOns of the 1960's, whICh
were accompamed by little or no legislative gUidance, those of the 1970' have been
accompamed by mcreasmgly comprehenSive legislative history. See, e.g., Clean Air
Act, S. REP No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 483 (1970); Voting Rights Act Amend
ments of 1975, H.R. REP No. 196, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 34 (1975), S. REP No. 295,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. 40-43 (1975), reprinted In [1975] 2 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD.
NEWS 774, 121 CONGo REC. 16244-46 (1975) (remarks of Rep. Don Edwards), and 121
CONGo REC. 16268-70 (1975) (remarks of Rep. Robert Drman); TOXIC Substances
Control Act, 122 CONGo REC. 8286-87 (1976) (remarks of Sen. John Tunney); Civil
Rights Attorney Fees Awards Act of 1976, SUBCOMM. ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, CIVIL RIGHTS ATTORNEY'S FEES
AWARDS ACT OF 1976 SOURCE BOOK. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, TEXTS, AND OTHER
DOCUMENTS, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
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whICh do not con tam such Important policIes); and then, to draft
language amending the laws, one by one. Also, care would have to
be taken to mclude fee prOVISIons m all future statutes whICh m
volve strong congressIOnal policIes. The legIslatIve process sImply
does not lend itself to thIS,31 and thus, the limitatIons of the spe
cific approach would remam if Congress were to contmue to rely
upon it almost solely
The specific approach IS limited mamly because it carves out a
partIcular portIon of an area of the law and deals with it without SI
multaneously dealing with related areas of the law 32 sometImes
even m other portIons of the same statute. 33 So long as the federal
courts were able to fill m the mterstIces, grantmg fees m cases
whICh promoted strong congreSSIOnal policIes but were brought un
der laws for whICh fees were not specifically authorIzed, then a de
gree of consIstency was achleved. 34 Now that the courts have been
31. Representative John Sieberling, testifYing on
number of attorneys fee
bills, hIghlighted problems of both Inattention and politics whICh create difficulties
when the specific approach IS used:
[W]e can often have an anomalous situation on particular bill, for example,
the Federal InsectiCIde, FungIcIde, and RodentiCIde Act, whICh IS now In
the process of being worked through the floor of the House. I expect to offer
an amendment to that act to authonze the awarding of attorneys fees, and
yet it IS possible that the House will reject that-you never know from one
bill to the next how the mood IS gOing to be. We could end up with pecu
liar situation where some statutes have such provISIon, and others do not.
Heanngs on Awarding of Attorneys Fees before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil
Liberties & the Admmlstration ofJustice of the House Comm. on the Judicwry, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 49 (1975) (testimony of Rep. John Seiberling).
32. Attorney fee proVISIons are Included In great number of envuonmental
statutes, e.g., the TOXIC Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2619(c)(2) (1976), the
Water Pollution Prevention & Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (1976); the Ocean
Dumping Act, Id. § 1415(g)(4); the Safe DnnkIng Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 30Oj-8(d)
(1976), the Clean Au Act, Id. § 1857h-2(d), the NOIse Control Act, Id. § 49U(d), and
yet they are not Included In, mter alia, the Federal InsecticIde, FungIcIde, and
RodenticIde Act, 7 U.S.C. § 131(d) (1976), although thIS Act has been amended or
supplemented four times Since Representative Seiberling comments. See note 31
supra.
33. Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 containS two citizen suit proVI
sIOns. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3610, 3612 (1976). Fees are available under the latter, but not the
former. Similarly pnor to passage of the Civil Rights Attorney Fees Awards Act of
1976, fees were allowed under Titles II and VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, but
not under Title VI of the same Act. And, pnor to passage of 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1976),
section of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, fees were al
lowed In antitrust actions where treble damages were recovered, but not In antitrust
actions resulting In only Injunctive relief.
34. Pnor to passage of the Civil Rights Attorney Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42
U.S.C. § 1982 (1976), hOUSing discnmInation statute passed dunng Reconstruction,
did not proVIde for attorneys fees, but the Fau HOUSing Act of 1968, whICh pro
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stnpped of the power to act mterstitIally the specific approach m
evitably mcludes certam types of cases while excluding others that
mvolve the same congressIOnal policIes.
The only solution under the specific approach IS to pass more
fee authonzmg statutes. That course presents problems whIch have
become eVIdent m the past few years as the number of fee prOVI
SIons proposed and enacted has mcreased dramatically 35 The sheer
number of fee bills proposed under the specific approach poses the
tWIn dangers that legIslators will tire of them qUIckly and stop
passmg them, or at the opposite extreme, they will become a tradi
tional part of the apparatus and will not be scrutInIzed closely
enough. 36
Should Congress contmue to rely solely upon specific fee leg
Islation, perhaps a modification by whIch fees are authonzed, when
appropnate, under all citizen suit prOVIsIOns of a particular statute,
rather than section by section, would be more sensible. More SIg
nificant modificatIons are needed, however, if the concept of attor
neys fees as a means of promotmg legIslative policy IS to have ade
quate force m the 1980's and beyond.

C.

Genenc Fee Leglslatwn

The genenc, or categoncal, attorneys fees prOVISIon IS mIdway
between the omnibus and specific statute. Under the genenc ap
proach, Congress selects an area of the law m whIch it determmes
that fees are essential, and authonzes fees m that area, rather than
statute by statute. 37 Even before Alyeska, Congress passed several
tected the same nghts, did. 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1976). The nonstatutory pnvate at
torney general rationale permitted the courts to award fees under the former, older
law. See, e.g., Lee
Southern Home-Sites, Inc., 444 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1971). Simi
larly, pnor to Alyeska, many courts used theIr equity powers to award fees m cases
under sections of statutes whICh were silent as to fees where other sections of the
same statute proVided for fees. See, e.g., Hall V Cole, 412 U.S. 1 (1973); Natural Re
sources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 484 F.2d 1331 (1st Cir. 1973).
35. See note 5 supra. The 95th Congress alone authonzed fees under one or
more sections of 17 different acts. [d.
36. From the pomt of view of those who have been most mterested m fee leg
Islation, such as pro-civil nghts, pro-consumer, pro-environment public mterest advo
cates, the Widespread recognition of how Important fees are has negative Side: the
prospect that their opponents will succeed m usmg fee legislation to promote anti
Civil nghts, anti-enVironmental, or pro-big bus mess poliCies. Some of the recent bills
authonzmg fees agamst the United States, two of whICh have, mcredibly, passed the
Senate, have made thiS prospect quite real. See notes 58 & 95 mfra. A great number
of Senators are now obVIOusly used to the Idea of attorneys fees as bemg m
the public mterest, and have ceased to examme them m any but cursory fashIOn.
37. Congress had earlier passed several genenc proVISIOns m commercial areas.
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genenc provlSlons m public mterest areas, m an attempt to aVOId
the straitjacket of specific statutes. 38
The genenc approach can encompass prOVISIons of varymg
scope and breadth. Under the genenc approach, Congress mIght
authonze fee shiftmg m cases that vIndicate a congressIOnal policy
as reflected In federal statutes, on (broadly) enVIronmental protec
tIon, or (narrowly) aIr pollutIOn, whether suit IS brought under the
Clean AIr Act3 9 or sectIOn 1983,40 mter alia. Also, fees mIght be
authonzed when a pnvate suit vmdicates statutory policIes on
(broadly) consumer protectIOn or (narrowly) faIr lending practIces.
In additIon, the genenc approach can, as m the Civil Rights Attor
ney s Fees Awards Act of 197641 or the Truth m Lending Act fee
proVIsIon,42 merely lump together vanous statutes whICh mvolve
SImilar nghts, and authonze fees under those statutes, m whICh
case the breadth of the measure depends upon the breadth of the
statutes listed.
Our narrowest genenc public mterest fee statute IS the fee
prOVISIon m the Truth In Lending Act,43 mitIally a specific prOVI
SIOn authonzmg fees for proof of VIOlatIons of the Act's disclosure
prOVISIOns. In 1974, the prOVISIon was amended to cover suits
brought under the FaIr Credit Billing Act,44 and m 1976, it was
agaIn amended to cover suits brought under the Consumer Leasmg
Act4 5 as well. ThIS provlSlon IS narrow both because it merely lists
specific statutes, makmg it, m essence, the eqUIvalent of three spe
cific prOVISIons, and because the statutes whICh it covers are preThe Copynght Act fee prOVlSlon, 17 U.S.C. § 505 (1976), baSically unchanged Since
1909, allows fees in any suit under title 17 of the United States Code; that IS, any
copynght case. The fee provISIon in t1ie Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1976), allows
fees "in exceptional cases, without limiting itself to any particular category of
patent case. The Clayton Act fee proVIsion, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976), IS also genenc,
mandating fees to anyone Injured by VIOlation of t1ie antitrust laws.
38. Section 718 of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U .S.C. § 1617 (1976),
was passed several years before the Alyeska deCISIOn. Section 408(a) of the FaIr
Credit Billing Act, Pub. L. No. 93-495, §§ 301-06, 88 Stat. 1500 (1974), whICh
amended the Truth In Lending Act fee prOVISIon, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(3) (1976), and
made it genenc, was passed seven months pnor to Alyeska. Section 402 of the
Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1975, 42 U.S.C. § 19731(e) (1976), was proposed
before, but passed after Alyeska.
39. 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (1976).
40. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West Supp. 1979).
41. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1988 (1976).
42. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(3) (1976).
43. ld.
44. Pub. L. No. 93-495, §§ 301-06,88 Stat. 1500 (1974).
45. Pub. L. No. 94-240, 90 Stat. 257 (1976).
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Clse and limited m theIr coverage. It IS generIC, nonetheless. Con
gress chose faIr lending practIces as an area for whICh fees were
approprIate, and proceeded to authorIze them m relevant statutes.
Another generIC fee prOVISIon whICh lists a number of statutes
m a gIVen area IS the Civil Rights Attorney s Fees Awards Act of
1976. 46 Here, Congress chose CIVil rIghts as an area for whIch fees
were essentIal, and authorIzed them m cases under SIX CIvil rIghts
provlslons. 47 Unlike the Truth m Lending Act,48 however, the
1976 Act IS the broadest fee statute to date because of the breadth
of one of the statutes covered, sectIon 1983. 49
Two additIonal public mterest generIC fee prOVISIons, sectIon
402 of the Votmg Rights Act Amendments of 197550 and sectIon
718 of the EducatIon Amendments of 1972,51 are drafted differ
ently Although these prOVISIons are less broad than the Civil
46. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1988 (1976).
47. The provISIons for which fees are authonzed under the Civil Rights Attor
ney Fees Awards Act of 1976 are: 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, 1986,
2000d-h (1976) (Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964), and 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-86
(1976) (Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972). The Act also allows fee
shifting In an extremely limited number of suits InvolvIng the Internal Revenue
Service. See notes 105-124 mfra and accompanyIng text.
48. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(3) (1976).
49. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). ThiS section provides cause of action for VIOla
tions of federal constitutional and statutory nghts by state or local offiCials. It was,
and still IS, the workhorse of Civil nghts law In that § 1983 allows suits for JUry dis
cnmInation, school desegregation, VIOlations of voting nghts, misuse of federal funds,
VIOlation of first and fourth amendment nghts, demal of due process or equal protec
tion, police misconduct, and even some consumer and envIronmental Issues. Section
1983 IS, In fact, so broad that it covers majority of the cases covered by the genenc
fee provISIons In both the Education Amendments and the Voting Rights Act Amend
ments.
An Admmlstration spokesperson, testifYIng at hearmgs on the Civil Rights Attor
ney Fees Awards Act and other fee bills, best summed up the breadth of § 1983
and the consequent breadth of the Attorney Fees Act:
[Section] 1983 IS by its nature so broad, that thiS would be tantamount to
virtually saYIng In all Civil nghts actions attorneys fees would be awarded.
The language of 1983, applies to any nghts, prIvileges, or Immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws.
1983 IS not even limited to the
Constitution: it also applies to nghts secured by the laws of the United
States. It would be general pnvate attorney general piece of legislation if
it were enacted.
Heanngs on Awarding of Attorneys Fees before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil
Liberties & the Adm,mstration ofJustice of the House Comm. on the Judic,ary, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 186 (1975) (testimony of Hon. Rex E. Lee).
50. 42 U.S.C. § 1973l(e) (1976).
51. 20 U.S.C. § 1617 (1976).
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Rights Attorney s Fees Awards Act of 1976,52 they are broader than
the Truth m Lending Act. 53 The Voting Rights Act fee prOVlSlon
authonzes fees for proof of vIOlatIons of the votmg guarantees of
the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments; the EducatIon Amend
ments fee prOVlSlon authonzes fees for proof of racIal discnmmatIon
m public elementary and secondary educatIon. Both of these prOVI
SIons, unlike the Fees Awards and the Truth m Lending Acts, de
fine theIr coverage m words rather than sectIons, and therefore,
cover an area m blanket fashIOn, regardless of the statute under
whICh suit IS brought. 54 The Votmg RIghts Act fee provlSlon IS less
narrow than the EducatIon Amendments measure SImply because
its definitIon of the area covered IS broader 55
All genenc statutes passed to date have dealt with substantIve
categones, but the genenc approach also mIght be used for proce
dural categones of cases. For example, a statute mIght authonze
the award of fees m certam types of admInIstratIve hearmgs,56 or m
certam types of rulemakmg, ratemakmg, licensmg, or adjudicatory
proceedings. 57 Also, a statute mIght authonze fee shiftmg when
52. 42 U.S.C. H 1981, 1988 (1976).
53. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(3) (1976).
54. One attendant benefit of thiS type of drafting IS that the proVISIOn covers
not only current statutes whICh the drafters might have overlooked, but future stat
utes m the area as well, so that it becomes difficult for case or class of cases to slip
through the holes.
55. 20 U.S.C. § 1617 (1976). Section 1617 could well have mcluded discnmma
tion based on sex, handicap or age as well as race, and state mstitutions of higher ed
ucation as well as elementary and secondary schools.
56. Several pieces of specific legislation covermg admmlstrative heanngs have
been passed m the last few years. Only one of those, however, section 122 of the
Public Utility Regulatory PoliCies Act of 1978, 16 U.S.C.A. § 2632(a) (West Cum.
Supp. 1979), IS truly fee shifting prOVISion, permitting the assessment of the fees of
successful mtervenors m ratemakmg proceedings agamst the utility seekmg the rate
mcrease. The other two fee provlSlons m the Federal Power Act, Id. § 825q-l(b)(2),
and the Federal Trade CommiSSIOn Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 57a(h)(l) (West
Cum. Supp. 1979), allow federal agency to mdemnify mtervenors m adminIstrative
heanngs out of funds appropnated for that purpose by the agency itself.
57. It would be necessary to qualify such statutes, so that they resulted m pro
mohon of the public, rather than pnvate, mterest. One way of accomplishmg thiS
would be to combme the categoncal and procedural genenc approach and to author
Ize fees when participation m heanngs has resulted m promotion of consumer or en
vironmental mterests. Another way of qualifymg such procedural statute would be
to allow fees to only those mtervenors who met certam critena, such as by requIrIng
that an mtervenor have little or no finanCial mterest m the outcome of the hearmg
or to reqUire that an mtervenor prove finanCial hardship before fees can be allowed.
The first method, combmmg procedural and substantive categones, IS by far the best
solution. It IS more effective way of ensurmg payment to mtervenors who promote
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ever a pnvate citizen IS successful m havmg the United States or
one of its officIals held m contempt. 58
The merits and drawbacks of genenc fee legIslation vary ac
cording to the breadth of the prOVlSlon. Any genenc measure
aVOIds the major problems of the omnibus provlSlon by dealing
with only one area of the law at a time, so that the congressIOnal
poliCIes mvolved are basICally the same, and uncertamty and m
conSIstency are dimIlllshed. 59 The genenc prOVISIon also deals conthe public mterest (the assets of groups such as the Consumers Umon or the Sierra
Club might preclude theu reimbursement under
financial hardship test, even
where they are acting as pnvate enforcers), while preventing the reimbursement of
those parties who are promoting pnvate mterests (but who might meet some per
sons definition of financial hardship, or whose financial mterest m the outcome
might be remote, or difficult to establish). As difficult as it may be to define promo
tion of consumer or environmental mterests, it IS probably safer and more equitable
to define what must be promoted, rather than to attempt to define who must do the
promoting.
58. Since the Alyeska decIsIOn, several legislators have mtroduced bills whICh
would authonze or mandate fees agamst the United States any time it lost Civil
case. E.g., H.R. 4903, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (Rep. Samuel Devme), mandating
fees agamst the United States as either plamtiff or defendant any time it did not suc
ceed; H.R. 913, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (Rep. John Hammerschmidt), mandating
fees agamst the United States as unsuccessful plamtiff only· S. 1001, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1977) (Sen. Pete Domemci), mandating fees agamst the United States as plam
tiff or defendant when it loses case, mandating proportional fees agamst the United
States as plamtiff or defendant when it partially loses, and authorIzmg fees agamst
the United States as plamtiff or defendant when it wms; S. 265, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1979) (Sen. Pete Domemci), mandating fees agamst the United States as plamtiff or
defendant when it loses, unless it can show its position was substantially Justified.
Both S. 1001 and S. 265 limited eligibility to mdivlduals with
net worth of less
than $1 million, and busmesses with net worth of less than $5 million.
While these bills may seem generiC, they are actually omnibus, because they au
thonze fee shifting m an almost limitless range of pnvate as well as public cases.
Both S. 1001 and S. 265 were passed by the Senate. S. 1001 passed m late 1977
as an amendment to the Legal Services Corporation Act, but was rejected as non
germane by the House of Representatives m conference. S. REP No. 96-253, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1979). S. 265 was recently passed by vote of 94 to 3 m the Sen
ate, 125 CONGo REC. SlO,924 (daily ed. July 31, 1979), and was sent to the House,
where its future IS uncertam. See note 95 Infra.
59. The· Similarities withm eXisting fee provIsIOns m one area mdicate that
Congress has normally adopted the same standards, and often the same statutory lan
guage, for cases ansmg withm the same area. For example, most of the statutes
authonzmg awards of attorneys fees m the environmental law field are the same:
the Water Pollution Prevention and Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (1976), the
Deepwater Ports Act, Id. § 1515(d), the Ocean Dumpmg Act, Id. § 1415(g)(4), and
the NOise Control Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4911(d) (1976), the Clean Au Act, ld. §
1857h-2(d), the Safe Dnnkmg Water Act, ld. § 30Oj-8(d) all use Identical language.
The same standards apply m most consumer protection fee proVIsIOns, e.g., Frur
Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681(n) (1976), Truth m Lending Act, ld. §
1640(a), and two provIsIOns of the Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savmgs Act,
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sistently with more than one statute at a tIme, and therefore, ac
complishes Congress goals more qUIckly and ratIonally than the
specific approach. With the genenc fee prOVISIon, it IS also eaSIer
to adapt rules of constructIon from one case to another than if
there are different types of fee proVISIons for cases under different
statutes. 60
As with omnibus legIslatIon, the problems whIch accompany
the broadest type of genenc fee prOVISIon revolve around difficul
tIes m definitIon and conSIstency m applicatIon. Because a genenc
prOVIsIOn does not cover both pnvate and public mterest cases,
these problems are less severe for genenc than for omnibus mea
sures, yet they still eXIst, and the broader the prOVISIon, the more
severe the difficultIes.
The broadest type of genenc fee prOVISIOn IS represented by a
bill offered by RepresentatIve Robert Drman shortly after Alyeska
was handed down, authonzmg fee shiftmg m suits under "any pro
VISIOn of law whICh prOVIdes for the protectIon of CIvil or constitu
tIonal nghts."61 The mtent of such a proVISIon IS to restore the pre
Alyeska situatIon, and remstate the equity power of courts to
contmue the evolutIonary process by whICh the pnvate attorney
general theory was gradually developed. Courts would exerCIse
broad discretIon m keepmg with the statutory and constitutIonal
poliCIes to be enforced m the cases before them.
At the same tIme, a statute such as that proposed by Repre
sentatIve Dnnan would restore the uncertamty that charactenzed
the pnvate attorney general line of cases as they stood at the tIme
of Alyeska. 62 If thIS situatIon were merely restored, envlfonmental
ld. §§ 1918(a), 1989(a). Similarly, the majority of antidiscnmmation fee provISIons
contam Identical language, e.g., Titles II and VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000a-3(b), e-5(k) (1976), Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1975, ld. §
19731(e), and Civil Rights Attorney Fees Awards Act of 1976, amending ld. § 1988;
and even where the language IS different (as with the Education Amendments of
1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1617 (1976), and the FaIr Housmg Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c)
(1976)) the JudicIal mterpretation and legIslative hIstory have been SImilar.
60. For example, there IS potential conflict between 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1976),
for whICh fees are authonzed by the Civil Rights Attorney Fees Awards Act of
1976, and 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1976), the fee provIsIon of Title VIII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1968, both of whICh cover housmg discrImmation, but only one of
whICh, § 3612(c), reqUIres showmg that plamtiff IS unable to afford counsel before
an award can be made.
61. H.R. 7696 & 8742, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
T the same effect would be proVISIOn whIch authOrIzed discretionary fees III
public mterest cases alone III the mterests of justice, or one whICh authonzed fees to
prIvate attorneys general.
62. See note 29 supra.
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protectIon mIght warrant fee shiftmg m Oklahoma but not m
Tennessee, and the same suit brought m two different distncts
mIght warrant fees m one court and not m the other It IS, per
haps, easy enough to define a constitutional nght. But what IS a
CIvil nght?63 It would be difficult for Congress to elimmate confu
SIOn and uncertamty effectively m the language or legIslative hIs
tory of such a broad genenc provlSlon. 64 Therefore, the degree of
consIstency achIeved would depend upon JudicIal discretion, whiCh
can never be certam.
In areas m whiCh Congress can legIslate with greater specific
ity it should do so, and thereby aVOid the problems of uncertamty
and mconsistency In combmatIon with both specific and less broad
genenc fee provlSlons, however, a broad, carefully drafted genenc
statute would be useful. It would restore to the courts the power
to fill m the mterstIces when Congress had not acted specifically If
the courts were mstructed that the law provIded fees m cases un
der legIslation or constitutional prOVISiOns expressmg specific sub
stantive policy mconsistency mIght be mmimized.
As genenc fee statutes become less broad, they become eaSIer
for courts to handle. EnvIronmental protection, consumer protec
tion, and housmg discnmmatIon are all relatively easy to recognIZe,
even if they are not easy to define. Standards are eaSIer to draft
when a more specific case IS mvolved, and the same standards can
safely be applied to all cases withm the area. 65 ThIS does not mean,
however, that less care need be taken m draftmg the standards.
More care IS necessary because the prOVISIon will cover a greater
number of cases than would the ordinary specific statute, and
any mIstake would, therefore, affect more cases.

63. See the confUSing diSCUSSIOn of Civil nghts, as used In 28 U.S.C. §
1343(4) (1976), In Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Orgamzation, 99 S. Ct. 1905,
1916-17 (1979).
64. While the differences among public Interest laws are much less strikIng
than the differences between public Interest laws and laws InvolVIng prIvate Inter
ests, these differences do eXist. Hence, the Similarities In fee provIsions for gIVen
type of public Interest case (fees to "the prevailing party In Civil rIghts laws) do not
necessarily carry over to fee proVISIOns In other public Interest areas (fees to any
party In envIronmental laws). But, because fee awards In all of these cases are
based upon the same rationale of encouragIng VIndication of strong congressIOnal
poliCies, some of the broader techmcal questions could be answered, In only gen
eral fashIOn, for such prOVISIOn.
65. See note 59 supra.
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DRAFTING THE STATUTE

Standards for Recetpt

The prevIOUS sectIon has discussed the ways Congress mIght
define the areas m whIch attorneys fees can be awarded. In a sys
tem m whIch attorneys fees are vIewed not as a regular means of
mdemnifymg a prevailing litIgant, but as a means of promotmg na
tIonal poliCIes, the selectIon of subject matter areas IS meanmgless,
or even dangerous, unless there IS some limitatIon on the partIes
who are eligible to recover fees m the covered areas. Thus, while
the English routmely award fees m a neutral fashIOn to either SIde,
m the United States, Congress must always specify m each of its
fee statutes, mter alia, who may recover fees and how readily fees
may be awarded.
Almost mvarIably Congress has favored plamtiffs who were
smng to enforce congressIOnal policIes. 66 As the number of fee pro
VISIOns has grown, however, Congress method of achIevmg thIs
goal has vaned. For many years, the sole format provIded manda
tory fees to plamtiffs only when plamtiffs prevailed. More recently
Congress has passed many statutes authonzmg a discretIonary fee
award to plamtiffs or defendants, mamtammg the pro-plamtiff tradi
tIon by establishmg different standards for awarding fees to prevail
mg plamtiffs and prevailing defendants. Under the new "two-way"
statutes, prevailing plamtiffs have been awarded fees almost as a
matter of course, while defendants have been entitled to fees only
rarely
From the Enforcement Act of 187067 until the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 nearly a century later the major fee prOVISIons, except for
those m cases mamly mvolvmg prIvate rIghts, limited eligibility to
plamtiffs. Nineteenth century cases mvolvmg state attorneys fees
statutes expressed grave doubts about the constitutIonality of one
way" measures, and held many of them unconstitutIonal. 68 A dis
tmctIon was soon drawn, however, favormg the validity of one-way
statutes whICh authOrIzed fees m pursuance of a remedial statutory
purpose. 69 Thus, m 1915, the Supreme Court upheld the prOVISIon
of the Interstate Commerce Act7° whICh authOrIzed fees for plam
66.
67
68.
69.
70.

But see note 28 supra.
Ch. 64, 16 Stat. 140 (1870).
Gulf C. & S.F.R. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150 (1897).
Atchison, T. & S.F.R. Co. v. Matthews, 174 U.S. 96 (1899).
49 U.S.C. § 16(2) (1976).
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tiffs only notmg that the fee authonzatIon was confined to cases
wherem a recovery IS had for damages resultmg from the vIOlation
of some duty Imposed m the public mterest by the act to regulate
commerce, and that one purpose of the fee prOVISIOn was "to pro
mote a closer observance of the dutIes so Imposed."71
The same concept was applied several decades later by Judge
Wyzanskt, m a case under the Frur Labor Standards Act:
The rationale m all the federal statutes IS the same. The ar
gument runs as follows. The government has set up a regulatory
system for the benefit of persons m the plamtiffs class. To make
the regulation effective pnvate suits as well as public prosecu
tions are permitted. Suits by plamtiffs, if well founded, are m
the public mterest. Therefore, the cost of prosecutmg successful
suits should be borne not by those who were VIctims but by
those who have VIOlated the regulations and caused the damage.
The fear of thIS liability for double damages and attorney s fees
not only aIds compliance, but promotes the settlement of contro
verSieS at the conference table or m the admIlllstratIve office
rather than the courts. No SImilar pomts, it IS thought, can be
made for Imposmg on an unsuccessful plamtiff the costs of the
defendant's lawyer. The defendant's vmdicatIon m a larger sense
serves the mterests of Justice, but no more so than the successful
defense of any suit. Therefore, the public IS not more mterested
m aIding hIm than any other successful defendant. Moreover, to
allow hIm to recover hIS out-of-pocket expenses would deter
suits by the plamtiffs who under the FaIr Labor Standards Act,
the Interstate Commerce Act, the Ann Trust Acts, the Packers
and Stockyards Act and so forth are assumed, often correctly to
be necessitous persons reqmnng the protective hand of the leg
Islature. Such deterrence runs counter to the policy of the Act m
placmg reliance for enforcement both upon pnvate suits and
public suits. 72

Because the Amencan custom calls for statutory attorneys fees
only m order to effectuate congressIOnal policy the pattern de
scribed m Hutchmson v. William C Barry, Inc. 73 guaranteemg
fees to plamtiffs while denymg them to defendants, IS the appropn
ate type of attorneys fees statute, or at least the appropnate start
mg pomt. In fact, none of our statutes, save those mamly dealing
71. Meeker v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 236 U.S. 412, 433 (1915).
72. Hutchmson
William C. Barry, Inc., 50 F Supp. 292, 298 (D. Mass. 1943)
(citing 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1976».

73.

ld.

1979]

PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGANTS

271

with pnvate nghts, has ever departed m any sIgnificant respect
from thIS model.
There have been, however vanatIons m the language of these
prOVlSlons, some of whICh could have allowed for sIgnificant
changes from the traditIonal and appropnate Hutchmson pattern.
Begmmng with the fee prOVlSlons m the Civil Rights Act of 1964,74
Congress has passed a number of fee prOVISIOns that authonze fees,
rather than mandate them, to "the prevailing party "75 to any
party "76 or to a party who has substantIally prevailed. "77 ThIS lan
guage had the potentIal for producmg far-reachmg and IrratIonal
changes m the pattern of Amencan fee statutes, either by watenng
down the entitlement of plamtiffs to collect fees, or, more danger
ously by makmg defendants eligible for fees to such an extent that
plamtiffs would be deterred and litIgatIon to enforce natIonal poli
CIes chilled. 78
These statutes, however, have been neither mtended nor con
strued m that way Instead, they have been uniformly construed to
make only slight modificatIOns m the Hutchmson pattern. Under
the two-way discretIonary fee provISIOns, plamtiffs almost always
are entitled to fees and defendants rarely are awarded them. In the
more recent fee provlSlons, thIS dual standard has been spelled out
either m the statutory language 79 or m the legIslatIve hIstOry 80 In
the earliest two-way public mterest fee prOVlSlons, Titles II and VII
74. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-3(b) to e-5(k) (1976).
75. E.g., ld; Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1617 (1976); Voting
Rights Act Amendments of 1975, 42 U.S.C. § 1973l(e) (1976); Civil Rights Attorney
Fees Awards Act of 1976, ld. §§ 1981, 1988.
76. E.g., Ocean Dumpmg Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1415(g)(4) (1976); Water Pollution
Prevention & Control Act, Id. § 1365(d); Clean Alr Act Amendments of 1970, 42
U.S.C. § 1857h-2(d).
77 E.g., Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) (1976); Pnvacy
Act, ld. § 552a(g)(l)(2)(B).
78. Not smgle fee prOVlSlOn Congress has ever passed, aSlde from the Norns
LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 107(e) (1976), has permitted the ready recovery of fees
by defendants. Thls lS true even for those fee provlslOns protecting pnvate nghts,
under whlch neither plamtiffs nor defendants may recover readily. See, e.g., Phillips
Petroleum Co.
Esso Standard Oil, 185 F.2d 672 (4th Cir. 1950) (patents); Steak &
Brew, Inc. v. Beef & Brew Restaurant, Inc., 370 F Supp. 1030 (S.D. Ill. 1974) (trade
E.!. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 257 F Supp. 729 (S.D.N.Y. 1966)
marks); Davls
(copynghts ).
79. E.g., Petroleum Marketing Practices Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 2805(d)(I), (3) (West
Cum. Supp. 1979); Fau Debt Collection Practices Act, ld. § 1692k(a)(3).
80. E.g., S. REP No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1976); H.R. REP No. 1558,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1976); 122 CONGo REc. 32185 (1976) (remarks of Sen. John
Tunney) (Civil Rights Attorney Fees Awards Act of 1976).
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of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, neither the statute nor the debates
shed any light on how the provlSlons should be Interpreted. The
Supreme Court, In a paIr of unanImous declSlons a decade apart,
made it clear that the proper constructIon, for that Act and any
other one with similar language, IS a dual standard close to the
Hutchtnson rule.
In 1968, In Newman v. Piggte Park Enterpnses, Inc. 81 the
Supreme Court held In a suit to enforce the public accommoda
tIons prOVlSlons of the Civil Rights Act that a prevailing plaIntiff
was a pnvate attorney general, the type of litIgant whom Congress
Intended to encourage
to seek Judicial relief. "82 The proper
standard for awarding attorneys fees to such a plaIntiff was, there
fore, broad: "It follows that one who succeeds In obtaInIng an In
JunctIon under [the public accommodatIons] Title should ordinarily
recover an attorney s fee unless special circumstances would render
such an award unjust. "83
Ten years later, the Supreme Court turned to the standard for
a defendant who prevails In a sImilar suit. In Chnsttansburg Gar
ment Co. v. Equal Employment Opportumty Commtsston,84 an em
ployment discnmInatIon suit under title VII of the 1964 Act, a
prevailing defendant argued that the neutrality of the statutory lan
guage entitled it to fees on an equal footIng with a prevailing
plaIntiff. The Supreme Court responded unanImously' "[T]he per
mISSive and discretIonary language of the statute does not even In
vite, let alone reqUIre, such a mechanIcal constructIOn. "85 Rather,
the Court contInued, the congressIOnal policy reqUIred that plaIn
tiffs and defendants be treated differently 86 so that defendants
were entitled to fees only under a very narrow standard, rather
than under the broad Newman standard. 87
81. 390 U.S. 400 (1968).
82. Id. at 402.
83. Id.
84. 434 U.S. 412 (1978).
85. Id. at 418.
86. First, as emphasized so forcefully m Piggle Park, the plaintiff IS the
chosen mstrument of Congress to vmdicate
policy that Congress conSid
ered of the highest priority Second, when district court awards counsel
fees to prevailing plamtiff, it IS awarding them agamst vIOlator of federal
law As the Court of Appeals clearly perceived, "these policy conSiderations
whICh support the award of fees to prevailing plamtiff are not present III
the case of prevailing defendant.
Id. at 418-19 (citation omitted).
87. "[AJ district court may m its discretion award attorney fees to prevailing
defendant m Title VII case upon finding that the plamtiff' action was frivolous,
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In some fee prOVISIOns, Congress has attempted to make cov
erage even more specific by distIngUIshIng among different catego
nes of plaIntiffs eligible for fees and defendants agaInst whom fees
mIght be assessed. For example, the FaIr HOUSIng Act of 1968 au
thonzes discretIonary fees to plaIntiffs alone, but only if they can
not afford to pay a fee. 88 A recent vanatIon of thIs theme has ap
peared In two statutes governIng certaIn specific types of regulatory
proceedings. Two prOVlSlons In the Public Utility Regulatory Proce
dures Act,89 passed In 1978, allow fees In specific regulatory proceed
mgs to prevailing Intervenors who meet tests of finanCial hardship. 90
Similarly the United States always has been treated m a man
ner different from other plamtiffs or defendants. In cases m whICh
the United States IS entitled to brmg suit, an applicable fee prOVI
SIOn will always specifY that fees are available to the prevailing
party other than the United States. 91 Under no federal attorneys
fees prOVISIon IS the United States entitled to recover fees. 92 On
the other Side, the eXIstence of a general United States Governunreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought m subjective bad
faith. [d. at 421 (1978). The Supreme Court warned lower courts not to engage m
post-hoc analysIs makmg it too easy to deCide a case was fnvolous. The growmg
number of defendants fees (some from Judges who have never found for a plamtifl'
m an employment discrlmmation case) suggests that the Supreme Court' warnmg IS
bemg Ignored.
88. 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1976). Courts have construed thiS to mean mability to
pay reasonable fee (whICh may often be quite large), but not reqUlrmg pauper sta
tus. See, e.g., Moore
Townsend, 525 F.2d 482 (7th Cir. 1975). But see Stevens v.
Dobs, Inc., 373 F Supp. 618 (E.D.N.C. 1974).
89. 16 U.S.C.A. §§825q-l(b)(2), 2632(a) (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
90. Several other acts have mcluded legislative history to the same effect. See,
e.g., S. REP No. 1200, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10 (1974), repnnted In [1974] 3 U.S.
CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 6285 (Freedom of Information Act). Limitations of thiS
sort are most frequently seen m bills whICh concern administrative hearmgs and
agencies. It may be preferable m such Instances to narrow or further define the types
of proceedings covered, rather than to draw distinctions among classes of mtervenors
who would be eligible. See note 57 supra.
91. See, e.g., Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 505 (1976); Education Amendments of
1972, 20 U .S.C. § 1617 (1976); State and Local Fiscal ASSistance Amendments of
1976, 31 U.S.C. § 1244(e) (1976); Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1975, 42 U.S.C.
§ 19731(e) (1976); Titles II and VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Id. §§ 2000a-3(b)
to e-5(k).
92. Of course, the Legal Services Corporation, while federally funded, IS not
the United States for purposes of attorneys fee awards. The Corporation may be as
sessed fees if its employees or clients engage m groundless, fnvolous or vexatious
litigation, 42 U.S.C. § 2996e(f) (1976), see A/yeska Pipeline Servo Co. v. Wilderness
Soc y, 421 U.S. 240, 262n.36 (1975), and may receive attorneys fees under federal
fee provIsions. [d. See also, e.g., Rios V. Enterprise Ass Steamfitters Local 638, 542
F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1976); Hoitt V. Vitek, 495 F.2d 219 (1st Cir. 1974); Kulkarni V.
NyqUist, 466 F Supp. 1274 (N.D.N.Y. 1977).
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ment Immunity statute, sectIon 2412,93 has the effect of elimmatmg
the federal government from the category of covered defendants as
well, unless there IS an explicit mtentIon shown to waIve thIS Im
munity For thIS reason, the statutes under whICh litIgatIon agamst
the federal government IS specIally desIred by Congress generally
have a prOVISIon authonzmg fees agamst the United States. A ma
Jor example IS the 1972 amendments to Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,94 whICh specifically authonzed employment dis
cnmmatIon litIgatIon agamst the federal government based on ex
tensIve legIslatIve hIstory showmg Congress awareness that the
United States was engaged m WIdespread employment discnmma
tIon. 95
93. 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1976).
94. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1976).
95. In recent years there has been steady trend m the very rational direction
of putting the United States on the same footing as other parties m paymg fees. The
1972 amendments to title VII are prmclpal example, because they simply Imposed
upon the Government the same equal employment obligations, mcluding payment of
attorneys fees, as those born by all other employers.
For the past three or four years, however, attempts have been made to Impose
upon the United States obligations borne by no other litigant, private or public, m
this country or any other. While on the surface bills makmg the United States and
federal agencies liable for fees whenever they lose almost any Civil case may seem to
resemble traditional attorneys fee legislation, m fact such bills are not only wholly
unprecedented one-way omnibus legislation, but also legislation which would retard,
rather than augment, the poliCies of Congress. See, e.g., note 58 supra.
An extreme example of this type of legislation was S. 1001, whICh passed the
Senate In 1977 as an amendment to the Legal Services Corporation Act. See note 58
supra. This year, the Senate passed Similar bill, S. 265. Id. Although this bill tones
down some of the more extreme features of S. 1001, it remaInS wholly unprece
dented and dangerous omnibus legislation, contrary to both the fonn and alms of all
prevIous fee proVISIOns.
Fees are mandated m all Civil cases under S. 265 (except tort cases and except
where an eXisting statute proVides different rules) for any plaIntiff, defendant, or par
tiCipant In an admmlstrative adjudication who prevails agaInst the United States or
federal agency unless the federal government or agency can show that its position
was substantially Justified. Fees cannot be awarded an mdivldual whose net worth IS
more than $1 million, or bUSIness worth more than $5 million. T emphaSize the
nsks to the Government, S. 265 reqUires that any fee award be taken out of the par
ticular office or agency budget, whICh may not be supplemented for that purpose.
First, thiS bill would have greater Impact than any fee legislation before it. Be
cause the federal government IS the prmclpal litigator m the federal courts, S. 265
would have enonnous scope. The CongressIOnal Budget Office estimated that under
S. 265 fees would be awarded agaInst the United States and its agencies In nme
thousand cases year, for total of more than $108 million. S. REP No. 253, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). No figures are available for companson, but it seems likely
that both the caseload and dollar amounts are at least ten times the totals for awards
under all eXisting attorneys fee proVISIOns combmed.
Second, many of the cases In whICh fees would be awarded agaInst the federal
government would be pnvate cases, rangIng from cases InvolVIng condemnation and
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The selectIon of subject matter areas and limitatIons on cover
age of plamtiffs and defendants are not the only techmques for
shapmg an attorneys fee prOVlSlon, but they are probably the most
unportant. When the purpose of a fee provIsIon differs substantIally
from the customary one of encouragmg citIZens to sue m the pub
lic mterest, as it does III the areas of copynghts, trademarks, and
patents, Congress has not limited the coverage of plamtiffs and de
fendants, but mstead, has limited the readiness with whICh fees
should be awarded. 96 Similarly statutes whICh provIde mandatory
attornevs fees along with damages may suggest that a Judgment IS
reqmred for entitlement to a fee award,97 while the two-way dis-

forfeiture to cases mvolvmg government contracts and other unconnected categones,
m whICh there has been no showmg of any necessity for such legislation. There IS
no statute anywhere m the world whICh provides fees to one Side alone m purely
pnvate cases, nor IS there III the United States
statute mvolvmg pnvate nghts
whICh allows the assessment of fees m the absence of exceptional circumstances.
While the coverage of so great variety of pnvate cases, under standards whICh
allow ready recovery for one Side alone, IS departure of enormous magnitude, the
true danger of S. 265 and other similar measures, IS that they provide fees to defen
dants who successfully aVOid attempts at enforcement of congressIOnal poliCies. Un
der all of our prevIOus fee statutes, plamtiffs have never had to prove good faith, or
substantial Justification (a much harder test), to aVOid fee assessment. Rather, de
fendants have had to prove either bad faith or some vanation of bad faith on the part
of plamtiffs m order to obtam fees. A major portion of the government' litigation IS
statutory enforcement proceedings, such as voting suits to protect the nghts of black
voters, OSHA cases to allow employees to work m safety, or FDA proceedings to
keep dangerous drugs off the market. In these cases, the government IS pursumg the
national Interest m protecting nghts that Congress has guaranteed to its citizens. Un
der S. 265, the government as plamtiff would be unable to add to its budget when it
succeeded In enforcmg congressIOnal poliCies, but would be deterred from Initiating
enforcement proceedings by the prospect of budget reduction whICh could not be
Indemnified by additional appropnations.
ObvIOusly, the fact that the government could aVOid fee liability by showmg
substantial Justification for the position it unsuccessfully advanced, and the fact
that the very nch would be Ineligible for fees, would limit somewhat the damage
that S. 265 and its relatives would do to enforcement of our laws. There can be little
doubt, however, that the damage would be substantial.
Through the years, Congress has carefully deSigned attorneys fee provIsions to
foster law enforcement by encouraging the work of pnvate attorneys general. ThiS
bill would undermine all that work by its meat-ax approach to the critical enforce
ment work of the public Attorney General.
96. Fee provISIons m both the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (1976), and the
Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1976), limit fees to exceptional cases. While the lan
guage of the Copynght Act fee prOVISIon, 17 U.S.C. § 505 (1976), does not contam
thiS explicit limitation, it has been mterpreted In pan passu with the other proVI
sions. See, e.g., note 78 supra.
97. E.g., Motor VehICle InformatIOn and Cost Savings Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1918(a),
1989(a)(2) (1976).
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cretlonary statutes have generally been construed to allow a court
to award fees upon a consent decree. 98
These differences all have effects on the operatlon of our laws
that go far beyond what one mIght expect from the relatively mmor
differences m the wording of the attorney s fee prOVlSlons. For thIS
reason, the preCIse wording of fee prOVISiOns IS of vital Importance
to effectuate the purposes for whiCh Congress passes them.

B.

Precfse Wording

If an attorneys fees prOVISIon IS to be applied exactly as Con
gress mtends, Congress must scrutImze, carefully every word con
tamed m the provlSlon. A careless attitude on the part of Congress
can result not only m attorneys fee prOVISiOns whiCh are meffectlVe
or anomalous, but also m proVISIons whiCh are extremely counter
productive.
Section 718 of the Education Amendments of 1972,99 for ex
ample, authonzes fees "upon the entry of a final order by a court
of the United States.
The reqmrement of a final order may
have been a legIslative compromIse, or it SImply may have been an
expenment with a new form of fee legIslation. ThIS IS now partlcu
larly eVIdent m school desegregatIOn cases, whIch often drag on for
a decade or more, as an example of the type of draftmg whiCh
breeds confuSIon. Fortunately the Supreme Court, m Bradley v.
School Board,lOo mterpreted the prOVlSlon as granting a Judge dis
cretion to award fees and costs mCIdent to the final disposition of
mtenm matters. "101 The legIslative hIStOry of section 718 gave no
mdicatIon whether the wording was mtended to reqmre that a case
be completed pnor to an award, or whether the Supreme Court's
mterpretatIon was correct. In thIS one mstance, little damage was
done, but thIS defect could have senously thwarted Congress pur
pose.
Similarly the Clayton Act 102 fee prOVlSlon mandates an award
of fees to anyone "injured m hIS busmess or property by reason of
98. See, e.g., Barrett v. Kalinowski, 458 F Supp. 689 (M.D. Pa. 1979); Regalado
v. Johnson, 79 F.R.D. 447 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (Civil Rights Attorney Fees Awards Act
of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976)); Parker v. Matthews, 411 F Supp. 1059 (D. D.C.
1976) (Title VII of tlie Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1976)); Aspua
of N.Y., Inc. v. Board of Educ., 65 F.R.D. 541 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (Education Amend
ments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1617 (1976)).
99. 20 U.S.C. § 1617 (1976).
100. 416 U.S. 696 (1974).
101. ld. at 723.
102. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
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anythmg forbIdden m the antitrust laws.
"103 The wording of
the prOVlSlon, reqmnng a showmg of mJury prevented payment of
fees to those who were successful m enJommg antitrust vIOlations,
so that litigants who prevented the vIOlations receIved neither
damages nor fees, while litigants who receIved treble damages for
the VIOlations also were awarded fees. ThIS extreme anomaly finally
was elimmated by passage of a fee section m the Hart-Scott-Rodino
Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 whICh authonzed fees m anti
trust mJunctIon cases. 104
An example of a prOVISIon m whICh Congress did proceed
carefully IS the Allen Amendment, that portion of the Civil Rights
Attorney s Fees Awards Act of 1976 whIch authonzes fees to
a taxpayer who prevails "in any CIvil action or proceedings, by or
on behalf of the United States of Amenca, to enforce, or chargmg a
VIOlation of, a prOVISIon of the United States Internal Revenue
Code.
"105 ThIS genenc proVISIon withm a genenc prOVISIon
was drafted to prOVIde a small measure of relief for taxpayers m the
most extreme cases, and its preCIse wording has accomplished Just
that purpose.
The Allen Amendment was mserted m the Senate bill (S.
2278)106 whICh became the 1976 Act, as a compromIse. Proponents
of the bill, who were mterested m passmg a prOVISIon to enhance
CIvil nghts, accepted the Amendment as a way to end a filibuster
by Senator James Allen of Alabama. After seven days of debate,
the Allen Amendment was adopted unammously 107 and debate on
the Senate bill Immediately came to a close. While proponents of
the bill were willing to accept the Allen Amendment as a means of
ending the Senator s filibuster they carefully made sure, m several
ways, that the effect of theIr conceSSIOn would be mimmai.
First, and most vitally the Amendment's preCIse wording al
lows a taxpayer to recover fees m a suit only when brought "by or
on behalf of the United States.
"108 In almost all tax litIgation,
of course, it IS the taxpayer who, havmg paid a challenged assess
103. ld.
ld. § 26.
105. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976).
106. S. 2278, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1976).
107. 122 CONGo REC. 33312 (1976). ThIS vote was taken after floor manager of
S. 2278 mdicated that the Amendment was acceptable. ld. (remarks of Sen. James
Abourezk). Senator James Allen mdicated that the filibuster would end if the
Amendment were adopted. 122 CONGo REC. 33311 (1976).
108. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976).
104.
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ment, sues for a refund. 109 Second, repeated statements made dur
mg debate over the bill m both Houses showed that Congress m
tended the prOVlSlons to be mterpreted exactly as written. 110
Speakers m both Houses were also careful to pomt out that, even
m those few tax cases m whICh the United States was a plamtiff,
the standard applied to a prevailing taxpayer would be that applied
to other prevailing defendants under the Senate bill; that IS, the
taxpayer could receIve fees only when the United States had
brought suit fnvolously or vexatiously 111
One Judge has opmed that Congress was SImply unaware that
taxpayers are almost always plamtiffs m tax litigation, and did not
realize that the Allen Amendment would have so mmor an ef
fect. 112 Several commentators have agreed with thIS assessment. 113
109. [Wjhen the Government asserts and the taxpayer demes liability for
tax, the Internal Revenue laws are so framed that it IS the taxpayer who
must sue. If the taxpayer should wait for the Government to sue him, he
would allow the assessment to become final, and hiS nght to contest hiS lia
bility would be gone forever.
Aparacor, Inc. v. United States, 571 F.2d 552, 558 (Ct. Cl. 1978) (en banc) (Nichols, J.
concurrmg).
llO. Proponents of S. 2278 took care to specify that only taxpayer defendants
could collect fees almost every time they spoke about the Allen Amendment. See,
e.g., CONGo REC. 33312 (1976) (remarks of Sen. Edward M. Kennedy); Id. (remarks
of Sen. John Tunney); 122 CONGo REC. 35114 (1976) (remarks of Rep. John
Anderson); 122 CONGo REC. 35116 (1976) (remarks of Rep. Robert McClory); 122
CONGo REc. 35124 (1976) (remarks of Rep. Robert Kastenmeler). Representative
Drman, floor leader of the bill m the House, pomted out at one time that the
Amendment would not apply to actions mstituted agamst the Government by the
taxpayer. 122 CONGo REC. 35122 (1976) (remarks of Rep. Robert Drman). Even Sen
ator Allen, sponsor of the Amendment, the only time he referred to the Amendment,
said:
What it does IS to add to the Civil nghts attorneys fees proVISIOn pro
vIsion that if the Internal Revenue Service or the U.S. Government bnngs
Civil action agamst taxpayer, then the court, m its discretion, Just as m the
other cases, would be entitled to award the taxpayer reasonable attorneys
fees. That IS all it does, and I hope the amendment will be agreed to.
122 CONGo REC. 33311 (1976) (remarks of Sen. James Allen).
llI. See, e.g., 122 CONGo REC. 33312 (1976) (remarks of Sen. John Tunney);
122 CONGo REC. 33312-13 (1976) (remarks of Sen. Ted Kennedy); 122 CONGo REC.
35115 (1976) (remarks of Rep. John Anderson); 122 CONGo REC. 35116 (1976) (re
marks of Reps. Robert McClory and Robert Drman); 122 CONGo REC. 35123 (1976)
(remarks of Rep. Robert Drman); 122 CONGo REc. 35126 (1976) (remarks of Rep.
Robert Kastenmeler).
112. Aparacor, Inc.
United States, 571 F.2d 552, 558 (Ct. Cl. 1978) (en banc)
(Nichols, J. concurrmg).
113. See generally Pollack, Attorneys Fees In Tax Litigation: RemedYing the
'Substantive Imbalance, 45 BROOKLYN L. REV 53 (1978); Comment, Court
Awarded Attorneys Fees In Tax Litigation: 42 U.S.C. § 1988, 126 U. PA. L. REV
1368 (1978).
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The Senate floor leaders, who were responsible for agreemg with
Senator Allen on the wording of an acceptable amendment, knew
what effect the wording would have. 114 While Senator Allen subse
quently mdicated that he had mtended the Amendment to have far
broader applicatIon,115 what he and those who Jomed hIm m both
the filibuster and sponsorshIp of the Allen Amendment 116 thought
IS of no moment, except for students of legIslatIve tactIcs and the
legIslatIve process. Neither Allen nor hIS cosponsors voted for final
passage of the bill, even as amended. While those senators not re
sponsible for shepherding the bill or filibustermg for its acceptance
may not have known that taxpayers are almost always plamtiffs,
they could not have expected wIdespread applicatIon of the Allen
Amendment. All those present at the debates heard floor state
ments made both before acceptance of the Amendment 117 and after
passage of the bill 118 that the Amendment would apply only to
those cases m whICh the government acted m bad faith. 119
A number of tax lawyers and other commentators have tned to
recast the Allen Amendment as they Wish Congress had drafted it,
Ignormg the reality of what Congress did. They have emphaSIzed
the mmor effect the prOVlSlon has had,120 and have argued agamst
114. Most tellingly, Senator John Tunney, ongmal sponsor of S. 2278, dealt
with
potential hole by specifymg, before adoption of the Amendment, that it
would not apply to situation where the Government IS plamtiff on appeal smce
the Government did not brmg the action m the first mstance. 122 CONGo REc.
33312 (1976).
115. 123 CONGo REC. S732 (daily ed. Jan. 14, 1977) (remarks of Sen. James
Allen).
116. Cosponsors of the Amendment were also those who had, from time to time
dunng the debate, JOined m the filibuster with Senator Allen: Senators Jesse Helms
of North Carolina, Strom Thurmond of South Carolina, and William Scott of
Virgmla.
117. 122 CONGo REC. 33312 (1976) (remarks of Sen. John Tunney).
118. 122 CONGo REc. 33312-13 (1976) (remarks of Sen. Edward M. Kennedy).
119. The same IS true on the House Side, where the Congressmen were told by
the House floor leader that fees would be allowed under the Allen Amendment only
m umque and really Impossible Circumstances, and that the cost of the Amend
ment to the federal government would be negligible because of the Amendment'
limited application. 122 CONGo REC. 35116, 35122 (1976) (remarks of Rep. Robert
Drman).
120. There have been but two fee awards under the Allen Amendment smce its
adoption more than three years ago. United States V. Garnson Construct. Co., (1977)
2 U.S. Tax Cas. ~ 9705, at 88,387 (N.D. Ala. 1977); Levno v. United States, 440 F
Supp. 8, 11 (D. Mont. 1977). The latter Ignored the Amendment' wording and legiS
lative history. But those who argue that Congress could not possibly have mtended
such limited result should be aware that there have been no awards made under
either § 1985 or § 1986, two other provIsIOns for whICh the Civil Rights Attorney
Fees Awards Act of 1976 authonzes fees.
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a literal" and "too techmcal" reading of the Amendment,121 as
summg that Congress must have mtended to do more. Although
courts have, with one exceptIon,122 followed precIsely the mstruc
tIons of Congress, they have called the wording of the Allen
Amendment ambIguous" and have mvented "confusIOn m the
courts because of its supposed ambIguity and its "unclear and m
consIstent" legIslatIve hIstory 123 Any legIslatIon, however can be
called ambIguous, unclear, and mconsistent when gIVen an mter
pretatIon whICh was unmtended by its drafters.
The argument that the Allen Amendment should be gIVen an
mterpretatIon not permitted by its terms, so that it can be one of
the most sIgnificant developments for the future of tax law (and tax
lawyers),"124 overlooks the care and deliberatIon with whICh the
bill was drafted. The argument rests on the premIse that Congress,
m the mIdst of cruCIal debate over the long-studied l25 subject of
fee awards that would make it possible for CIvil nghts litIgants
(many of them poor and of mmority groups) to brmg suits to end
raCIal and sex discnmmatIon and enforce long-neglected constitu
tIonal nghts, suddenly diverted from that path so that they could
casually enact an enormously far-reachmg change m the hIghly
techmcal field of fundamental tax enforcement policy for the bene
fit of those wealthy mdividuais and corporate taxpayers who feel
that they have been overcharged enough to merit litIgatIOn. With
all due respect to those who put thIS theory forward, it somehow
seems more sensible to read the law as Congress wrote it.
121. Comment, Court Awarded Attorneys Fees m Tax Litigation: 42 V.S.C. §
1988, 126 U. PA. L. REv 1368, 1376 (1978).
122. See note 120 supra.
123. Comment, supra note 121, at 1386.
124. B. BITTKER, L. STONE & A. WARREN, JR., FEDERAL INCOME, ESTATE AND
GIFT TAXATION 261 (Supp. 1977). See also ZifI'ren, Tilting at the IRS Windmill?
Take Heart, The Los Angeles Times, May 11, 1977 § 2, at 5, col. 4.
125. Congress began In-depth study of the Issue of court-awarded attorneys
fees In 1973. Heanngs on The Effect of Legal Fees on the Adequacy of Representa

tion Before the Subcomm. on Representation of Citizen Interests of the Sen. Comm.
on the Judic,ary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). Further hearings were held by the
House In the wake of Alyeska several years later, Heanngs on Awarding of Attor
neys Fees Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Admm,stration
of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judicwry, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), and
specifically on the Issue of attorneys fees awards against the Federal Government
two and half years after that. Heanngs on The Awarding of Attorneys Fees m Fed
eral Courts Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Adm,mstration
of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judicwry, 95th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess.
(1977-78).
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As the Allen Amendment shows, courts do mterpret the laws
as Congress writes them, and because they do, extreme care must
be taken to aVOid language the techmcal mterpretatIon of whICh
makes possible unmtended results. The placement of certam lan
guage must be exammed carefully 126 and the most well under
stood terms of art must be scrutImzed127 lest a fee prOVISIOn be
gIven a broader or narrower effect than mtended.
CONCLUSION

Alyeska Pipeline SerVlce Co. v Wilderness Soclet y 128 stated
the Amencan rule: "In the United States, the prevailing litIgant IS
ordinarily not entitled to collect a reasonable attorneys fee from
the loser "129 That case has made it necessary to recogmze that the
real Amencan rule, every bit as deeply rooted m our hIstory and
m congreSSIOnal policy "130 IS that attorneys fees are granted m the
United States to pnvate parties who act as agents of public policy
Statutory prOVISIOns authonzmg fees--t-O--pnvate attorneys gen
eral are not exceptIons to, but an mtegral part of, the Amencan
rule. Those many prOVlSlons whICh Congress has passed over more
than a century have not been, as may appear on the surface, hap
126. For example, the Civil Rights Attorney Fees Awards Act of 1976, as
amended by the Allen Amendment, read:
In any action or proceeding to enforce proVISIOn of sections 1977, 1978,
1979, 1980 and 1981 of the ReVIsed Statutes, title IX of Public Law 92-318,
or In any CIVil action or proceeding, by or on behalf of the United States of
Amenca, to enforce, or charging vIolation of,
proVISIOn of the United
States Internal Revenue Code, or title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the
court, In its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United
States, a reasonable attorney fee as part of the costs.
122 CONGo REC. 33315 (1976) (Allen Amendment italiCIzed).
Had the Amendment been Included withIn the ongInal language of the proVI
SIOn, the placement of the Amendment mIght have been read to preclude fees In
suits under title VI unless such suits were Initiated by the United States.
127. AgaIn, the Allen Amendment Includes the term action or proceeding
to enforce
Some have argued that the word proceeding Includes the sending
of tax defiCIency notice to taxpayer by the Internal Revenue ServIce; hence the
taxpayer who subsequently files suit contesting the determInation of defiCIency IS
defendant In
proceeding, even if plaIntiff In an action, to enforce the Internal
Revenue Code. While courts have rejected thIS, and SImilar, arguments, see, e.g.,
Aparacor, Inc. v. United States, 571 F.2d 552, 553-56 (Ct. CI. 1978) (en banc); Engel
v. United States, 448 F Supp. 201, 202 (W.D. Pa. 1978), fee legIslation should be
drafted with preCISIon, to aVOId even the possibility that such arguments mIght be
accepted.
128. 421 U.S. at 240.
129. Id. at 247
130. Id. at 271.
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hazard. Rather they have all fit thIs pattern. As Congress begms to
rely even more heavily on the prIvate attorney general, it must ex
amme the dimenSIOns, standards, and wording of its ever mcreas
mg number of fee statutes lest it madvertently abrogate the true
AmerIcan rule.

